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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEX, LIES AND RAPE SHIELD STAT­
UTES: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INTERPRETING RAPE SHIELD 
STATUTES TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE VICTIM'S 
MOTIVE TO FABRICATE 
INTRODUCTION 
Rape shield statutes prevent criminal defendants from intro­
ducing evidence at their trials about the sexual assault victim's! sex­
ual history.2 These exclusionary statutes are controversial because 
of the strong competing interests involved.3 On one side, the sexual 
assault victim has a privacy interest.4 Rape shield statutes prevent 
an accused from examining embarrassing and humiliating details 
from the victim's sexual history in the accused's trial.s By excluding 
this evidence, proponents of rape shield statutes believe that rape 
shield statutes encourage women to report sexual assaults and help 
to eliminate gender bias in the courtroom.6 
On the other hand, rape shield statutes may exclude evidence 
1. In this Note, the words victim and alleged victim will be used interchangeably. 
2. For example, the Massachusetts Rape Shield Statute states: 
Evidence of the reputation of a victim's sexual conduct [and] ... [e]vidence of 
specific instances of a victim's sexual conduct ... shall not be admissible [in a 
sexual assault proceeding] except [as] evidence of the victim's sexual conduct 
with the defendant or evidence of recent conduct of the victim alleged to be 
the cause of any physical feature, characteristic, or condition of the victim; 
provided, however, that such evidence shall be admissible only after an in 
camera hearing . . . . 
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 21B (1992). 
3. See, e.g., Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998,1002-03 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (acknowl­
edging both the legitimate interests of rape shield statutes and the accused's right to 
present testimony in his own behalf), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 57 (1994). See infra notes 
129-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Stephens. 
4. ld. See also Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute and 
Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 914, 972-73 (1994) (men­
tioning that rape shield statutes are enacted to protect a sexual assault victim's privacy 
interests); Tanya Bagne Marcketti, Note, Rape Shield Laws: Do They Shield the Chil­
dren?, 78 IOWA L. REv. 751, 755 (1993) (rape shield statutes "protect the victim's legiti­
mate expectation of privacy"); Sakthi Murthy, Comment, Rejecting Unreasonable 
Sexual Expectations: Limits on Using a Rape Victim's Sexual History to Show the De­
fendant's Mistaken Beliefin Consent, 79 CAL. L. REv. 541,551 (1991) (noting one of the 
rape shield statute's purposes is to protect the privacy of victims). 
5. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991) (rape victims need protec­
tion from "surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy"). 
6. Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A 
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vital to the accused's defense.7 Such exclusions could compromise 
the accused's right to a fair trial by preventing consideration of evi­
dence which may tend to show that the sexual assault victim 
fabricated the charges against the accused.8 When the victim's mo­
tive to fabricate is related to her sexual history, it becomes difficult 
to fulfill the objectives of rape shield statutes without infringing 
upon the defendant's right to examine the victim's motive to 
fabricate. 9 
This Note considers the issue of whether courts should inter-. 
pret rape shield statutes to exclude evidence relating to the victim's 
motive to fabrIcate when that evidence incorporates the victun's 
prior sexual conduct. Part I discusses the. background of both the 
accused's right to present testimony examining a witness's motive 
to fabricate and rape shield statutes .. Part II.A weighs the interests 
protected by rape shield statutes against the defendant's right to 
examine a witness's motive to fabricate in light of United States 
Supreme Court precedent. Part II.A concludes that Supreme Court 
precedent prevents courts from interpreting rape shield statutes to 
exclude sexual history evidence when it relates to the victim's mo­
tive to fabricate. However, Part II.B discusses how courts can use 
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763,767,773-76 (1986) (discussing 
rape law reform movement and critically examining different rape shield schemes). 
7. See, e.g., Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1002-03. See also Steven I. Friedland, Date Rape 
and the Culture ofAcceptance, 43 FLA. L. REv. 487, 516 (1991) (stating that the right to 
cross-examine victim for motive to lie may be an innocent accused's last hope); Lisa· 
Hamilton Theilmeyer, Note, Beyond Maryland v. Craig: Can and Should Adult Rape 
Victims Be Permitted to Testify by Closed-Circuit Television?, 67 IND. LJ. 797, 813 
(1992) ("Prohibiting criminal defendants accused of rape from introducing evidence 
available to defendants ori trial for any other crime clearly implicates the confrontation 
clause."). 
8. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961) (citing 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, 
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 442, 444 (1882». Noted criminal law 
authority, Sir James Stephen, said: "I am convinced by much experience that question­
ing, or the power of giving evidence is a positive assistance, and a highly important one 
...." Id. See infra note 15 for a discussion of Ferguson. 
9. A motive to fabricate in the context of sexual assault is evidence that suggests a 
victim might be lying about the occurrence of the sexual assault. See Stephens, 13 F.3d 
at 1002-03 (considering the defendant's contention that the victim invented the sexual 
assault charges against the defendant because the defendant had made vulgar state- . 
ments which incorporated the victim's sexual history). See also United States v. Payne, 
944 F.2d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "[t]he right to confront witnesses in­
cludes the right to ... show their possible bias or self-interest in testifying," but that the 
defendant's evidence was not relevant to the victim's motive to fabricate), cert. denied, 
503 U.S. 975 (1992); United States v. Nez, 661 F.2d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting· 
that the motive to fabricate is always a proper subject for examination although the 
defendant could not characterize the evidence as such for the first time on appeal). 
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existing rules of evidence to dull the effect of this conclusion on 
rape shield statutes. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This part discusses the background of the sexual assault de­
fendant's and victim's conflicting rights. Part I.A discusses the ori­
gin and evolution of the defendant's right to present witnesses in his 
or her own behalf. Particularly, this section focuses on the United 
States Supreme Court's recognition of the defendant's right to ex­
amine a witness's motive to fabricate. Part I.B examines the history 
of rape shield statutes by considering legislative and judicial treat­
ment of rape shield legislation. 
A. 	 The Right to Present Testimony and the Right to Examine a 
Witness's Motive to Fabricate 
1. Evolution of the Right to Present Testimony 
, The Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause guaran­
tees to the accused the right to present witnesses in his own be­
half. tO In federal cases, the Sixth Amendment can be used to 
enforce this right.ll In,state cases, the right to present witnesses is 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, 
which the United States Supreme Court has concluded incorporates 
the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause.12 Included in 
the defendant's right to present witnesses in his or her own behalf is 
the privilege to testify in one's own behalf.13 This has not always 
been the case.14 
In sixteenth century England, prisoners were allowed to argue 
10. u.s. CoNST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prose­
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id. 
11. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas,483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987) (holding Arkansas's rule 
that hypnotically refreshed testimony is inadmissible per se violates the criminal de­
fendant's right to testify in his or her own behalf). See infra notes 31-36 and accompa­
nying text for a discussion of Rock. ' 
12. E.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967). The Fourteenth Amend­
ment Due Process Clause requires that "[n]o state ... deprive any person of life,liberty, 
or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, d. 1. 
13. Rock,483 U.S. at 52. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a dis­
cussion of Rock. 
14. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) ("The right of an accused to testify 
in his defense is of relatively recent origin. Until the latter part of the preceding cen­
tury, criminal defendants ... were considered to be disqualified from giving sworn 
testimony ...."). 
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directly with the king's counsel,15 However, prisoners did not have 
the right to call witnesses or retain counsel,16 In seventeenth cen­
tury England, criminal defendants were first granted the right to 
present witnesses in their own behalf,17 After this change, the ac­
cused was no longer allowed to testify in his or her own behalf be­
cause he or she was considered to be an interested party and 
incapable of delivering competent testimony.18 
The practice of disqualifying the accused as a witness began to 
erode in the United States when, in 1859, Maine enacted the first 
statute allowing criminal defendants to testify during trials for cer­
tain offenses.19 Later, in 1864, Maine enacted the first comprehen­
sive statute in the "English-speaking world" that empowered 
criminal defendants to testify in all trials regardless of the offense.20 
Congress enacted a similar federal statute in 1878.21 
The United States Supreme Court attacked the common-law 
disqualification rule in Washington v. Texas.22 In Washington, the 
Court interpreted two Texas statutes that had the joint effect of ex­
cluding the testimony of a co-participant in the appellant's murder 
trial.23 The co-participant's testimony was essential to the accused's 
defense in his murder trial.24 Without the excluded testimony, the 
appellant was convicted.25 
In reversing the appellant's conviction, the Supreme Court 
held that the accused's right to have compulsory process for ob­
taining witnesses in his or her favor is incorporated in the Due Pro­
15. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570,573-74 (1961). In Ferguson, the United 
States Supreme Court, while examining a Georgia statute which was the last United 
States state statute to disqualify criminal defendants from testifying in their own behalf, 
discussed the history of the right to present testimony in one's own behalf. Id. at 571­
86. Ultimately, the Court did not strike down the Georgia statute because the defend­
ant did not raise the issue of the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 596. 
16. Id. at 573-74 (citing 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 326, 350 (1882». 
17. Id. at 574. 
18. Id. 
19. Jd. at 577. 
20. Id. 
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1994). The current federal statute, which is substantively 
the same as the original federal statute, states: "In trial of all persons charged with the 
commission of offenses against the United States ... the person charged shall, at his 
own request, be a competent witness." Id. 
22. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).· 
23. Id. at 16-17. Read together, the two Texas statutes prevented a person 
charged as an accomplice from testifying as a witness in favor of his partner. Id. at 16. 
24. Id. 
25. Jd. 
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cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 In so deciding, the 
Court applied the test of whether the Sixth Amendment Compul­
sory Process Clause is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial."27 
The Washington Court further stated that "[t]he right to offer testi­
mony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is 
in plain terms the right to present a defense . . . . This right is a 
fundamental element of due process of law."28 However, the Court 
did not have an opportunity to determine whether defendants have 
a right to testify in their own behalf because it was not faced with 
that issue. 
After Washington, the United States Supreme Court repeat­
edly stated in dicta that criminal defendants have a right to testify in 
their own behalf.29 However, the Court did not squarely confront 
the issue of whether a defendant could testify in his own behalf 
until Rock v. Arkansas.3D In Rock, the United States Supreme 
Court considered the Arkansas Supreme Court's adoption of a rule 
that hypnotically-refreshed testimony is inadmissible per se.31 The 
Court held that Arkansas's inadmissible per se rule violated the 
criminal defendant's right to testify in his own behalf.32 In so hold­
ing, the Court stated that the criminal defendant's right to testify in 
his or her own behalf has three textual sources in the Constitution: 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause; the Sixth Amend­
ment Compulsory Process Clause; and as a "necessary corollary" to 
26. [d. at 17-18. 
27. [d. at 18 n.6 (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)). 
28. [d. at 19. However, the defendant's right to present witnesses in his own be­
half may be abridged if other legitimate interests exist and preventing the defendant's 
proffered testimony is not "arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes ... [it was] 
designed to serve." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987). 
29. E.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975) (right to testify in 
one's own behalf is essential to due process); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 
(1971) ("Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense ...."). 
30. 483 U.S. 44 (1987). See also Louis M. Holscher, The Legacy of Rock v. Ar­
kansas: Protecting Criminal Defendants' Right to Testify in Their Own Behalf, 19 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 223 (1993); Andrew C. Callari, Note, Rock v. 
Arkansas: Hypnotically 'Refreshed' Testimony or Hypnotically 'Manufactured' Testi­
mony?, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 136 (1988); Dean R. Gallego, Note, Hypnosis and Crimi­
nal Defendants: Life in the Eighth Circuit and Beyond Rock v. Arkansas, 53 Mo. L. 
REv. 823 (1988); Carolyn E. Moller, Comment, The Courts' Reaction to Rock v. Arkan­
sas: The AdmiSsibility of a Witness's Testimony After He Has Been Hypnotized, 15 AM. 
J. TRIAL ADvoc. 559 (1992). 
31. Rock, 483 U.S. at 45. 
32. [d. at 62. Exclusion of hypnotically-induced testimony implicates the right to 
testify in one's own behalf because the defendant, if allowed, would have testified to 
what was in his mind. See id. at 56-61. 
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the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.33 
The Supreme Court also held in Rock that the defendant's 
right to testify in his or her own behalf has limitations.34 The Court 
emphasized that the right to testify in one's own behalf may give 
way to other legitimate interests.35 However, in abridging the de­
. fendant's right to testify in his own behalf, "restrictions ... may not 
be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed 
to serve. "36 
Through time, the courts have recognized the defendant's right 
to present relevant testimony. This right now includes the privilege 
to testify in one's own behalf.37 However, the Supreme Court has 
also recognized that the defendant's right to present relevant testi­
mony may be abridged by other legitimate interests in the criminal 
process. Courts may restrict the defendant's right if favoring other 
legitimate interests is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the 
detrimental effect on the defendant.38 
33. Id. at 51-53. The right to testify in one's own behalf is one of the rights "es­
sential to due process of law in a fair adversary process." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806,819 n.15 (1975) (holding that the trial court violated the appellant's Sixth Amend­
ment rights by forcing the appellant to accept a state-appointed public defender). In 
addition, the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment must logically include the accused's right to testify for himself. 
Rock, 483 U.S. at 52. Finally, the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled 
testimony must necessarily encompass the right. to testify if the defendant so desires. 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,229-30 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (holding de­
fendant's statement, which was inadmissible due to state's failure to satisfy procedural 
safeguards, was admissible to attack the defendant's credibility, provided it was proven 
sufficiently trustworthy). The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination 
"is fulfilled only when an accused is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he 
chooses to speak.'" Id. (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,8 (1964». 
34. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55. The Supreme Court had previously held that "[i]n the 
exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with estab­
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in 
the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 
(1973) (trial court's strict application of common-law rule against impeaching one's own 
witness, coupled with exclusion of testimony that should have been admissible under 
hearsay exception as a declaration against interest, violated appellant's due process 
rights). 
35. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56. For example, there is no constitutional right to pres­
ent perjurious testimo~y. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993) (increasing 
sentence for obstruction of justice did not violate criminal defendant's right to testify in 
his own behalf). 
36. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56. 
37. Id. at 51; Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986). 
38. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56. 
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2. 	 Importance of the Right to Present Testimony About a 
Witness's Motive to Fabricate 
In Davis v. Alaska39 and Olden v. Kentucky40 the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that the right to examine a witness's mo­
tive to fabricate is a critical part of the defendant's right to present 
evidence on his own behalf.41 In Davis, the petitioner was charged 
with and convicted of burglary and grand larceny.42 One of the key 
witnesses in the trial was a juvenile who was on probation for bur­
glary. The juvenile witness stated that he saw the petitioner with 
another man outside a blue Chevrolet sedan near the location of a 
safe that the petitioner allegedly stole.43 The prosecutor sought a 
protective order to shield the juvenile witness from references to his 
juvenile record. The petitioner objected to the protective order. 
He stated that he only intended to introduce proof of the juvenile's 
record to show that the juvenile witness identified the petitioner out 
of fear that his probation might be adversely affected if he did not.44 
39. 415 U.S. 308,319-21 (1974) (holding that the trial court should not have pre­
vented the defendant from introducing a juvenile witness's prior criminal activity under 
a juvenile record-protection statute,' because referring to the record was necessary to 
show that the witness had a motive to fabricate). For a discussion of Davis, see Leo A. 
Farhat & Richard C. Kraus, Michigan's "Rape-Shield" Statute: Questioning the Wisdom 
of Legislative Determinations of Relevance, 4 CoOLEY L. REv. 545, 553-54 (1987) (stat­
ing that sexual history evidence that implicates victim's motive to fabricate should be 
admissible under Davis); H. Lane Kneedler, Sexual Assault Law Reform in Virginia-A 
Legislative History, 68 VA. L. REv. 459, 495 n.139 (1982) (noting rape shield cases rely 
on Davis to allow defendants to examine victim's motive to fabricate); Alice Susan 
Andre-Clark, Note, Whither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael M., the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and Protecting Women from Sexual Aggression, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1933, 
1986 (1992) ("[T]he state's interest in protecting the witness [from exposure to sexual 
history evidence] may be stronger than in Davis . ... In rape cases, the victim may face 
a painful public exposure of her relationship with the defendant as well as her recent 
sexual history."). 
40. 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam). See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of Olden. For law review treatment of Olden, see Myrna S. Ra­
eder, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ohio's Efforts to Protect Children With
out Eviscerating the Rights of Criminal Defendant's Evidentiary Considerations and the 
Rebirth ofConfrontation Clause Analysis in Child Abuse Cases, 25 U. ToL. L. REV. 43, 
152 (1994) (discussing the holding of Olden); Eileen A. Scali en, Constitutional Dimen­
sions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. 
L. REv. 623, 648 n.103 (1992) (noting societal importance of right to examine a wit­
ness's bias); Christopher B. Reid, Note, The Sexual Innocence Inference Theory as a 
Basis for the Admissibility of a Child Molestation Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct, 91 
MICH. L. REv. 827, 831 n.17 (1993) ("refusal to allow the defendant to pursue ... 
[theory that the victim lied] violated [the defendant's] Sixth Amendment rights."). 
41. 	 Olden, 488 U.S. at 227; Davis, 415 U.S. at 320. 
42. 	 Davis, 415 U.S. at 308, 320-21. 
43. 	 Id. at 309-10. 
44. 	 Id. at 311. 
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The judge granted the motion for the protective order pursuant to 
an Alaska statute that prohibited the introduction of a juvenile's 
record in court.45 
After the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner's con­
viction, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.46 The 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, finding that the 
trial judge had violated the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to 
confront adverse witnesses.47 
The Court recognized that Alaska had valid interests in pro­
tecting the confidentiality of a juvenile's records. The Court noted 
that the state's interests included: preventing impairment of the ju­
venile's rehabilitation process; ensuring that the juvenile did not 
lose employment opportunities; preventing the juvenile from com­
mitting further delinquent acts; and allowing the juvenile to testify 
free from embarrassment and without damage to his reputation.48 
Recognizing these laudable interests, the Court stated that the "pol­
icy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's 
record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as 
the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness."49 
In Olden v. Kentucky,50 the United States Supreme Court fur­
ther noted the importance of the defendant's right to effectively 
cross-examine a witness for bias. In Olden, the petitioner, along· 
with a friend, was indicted for kidnapping, rape and forcible sod­
omy. The petitioner sought to introduce evidence that the victim, 
who was white, had a motive to fabricate because she did not want 
to risk the chance that the black man with whom she was living 
would discover her infidelity.51 The trial court excluded the evi­
45. Id. 
46. The Court considered the issue of: 
[W]hether the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant in a criminal 
case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross­
examination directed at possible bias deriving from the witness' probationary 
status ... when such an impeachment would conflict with a State's asserted 
interest in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of 
delinquency. 
Id. at 309. 
47. Id. at 320-21. 
48. Id. 319-20. 
49. Id. at 320. The Court also stated that "[t]he partiality of a witness is subject to 
exploration at trial, and is 'always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the 
weight of his testimony.'" Id. at 316 (quoting 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 940, at 755 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970». 
50. 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam). 
51. Id. at 229-30. The inference suggested by the petitioner is that the victim 
would rather her lover believe that she was raped than believe she engaged in a vol un­
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dence that the white victim was living with a black man. 52 The 
court specifically held that Kentucky's rape shield statute did not 
bar the evidence.53 However, the trial court held that the potential 
prejudice in allowing evidence of an interracial living relationship 
outweighed the probative value of the evidence.54 Subsequently, 
the petitioner was convicted of the forcible sodomy charge.55 
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the 
trial court's decision to exclude the evidence of the victim's living 
relationship violated the petitioner's Sixth Amendment Confronta­
tion Clause rights.56 In so holding, the Supreme Court relied heav­
ily upon its earlier decision in Davis v. Alaska.57 The Court noted 
that preventing a criminal defendant from questioning a witness to 
show bias violates the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.58 
The Court stated that "[s]peculation as to the effect of jurors' racial 
biases cannot justify exclusion of cross-examination with such 
strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of [the victim's] 
testimony."59 
Davis and Olden show that the Supreme Court considers the 
right to examine witnesses about their motive to fabricate to be 
highly important in protecting the defendant's due process rights. 
Neither the privacy interests similar to those protected by juvenile 
record shield statutes60 nor interests with speculative benefits61 can 
justify preventing a defendant from examining a witness's motive to 
fabricate. 
tary affair with the petitioner because there would be less of a chance that he would end 
their relationship. See id. 
52. Id. at 230. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 230-31. Allowing evidence of the couple's interracial living relationship 
might have lead a prejudiced juror to make a decision on an improper basis. Id. at 232. 
55. Id. at 230. 
56. Id. at 231. 
57. Id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974». 
58. Id. More specifically, the Court noted that it had recently affirmed Davis in 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), where it stated: 
[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that 
he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed 
to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby "to expose to 
the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to 
the reliability of the witness." 
Id. at 680 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318). 
59. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232. 
60. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320. 
61. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232. 
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B. Rape Shield Statutes and a Victim's Motive to Fabricate 
1. History of the Rape Shield Statute 
The rape shield statute is a relatively recent creation.62 At 
common law, the accused in a sexual assault trial was permitted to· 
show that the victim was unchaste by "inquiring into a victim's 
extramarital, consensual sexual relations."63 One of the reasons be­
hind this rule was that unchaste women were considered dishon­
est.64 Further, supporters of the common-law doctrine allowing 
evidence of the victim's extramarital sexual relations justified the 
doctrine by stating that a woman's unchaste character is probative 
on the issue of whether the woman consented to sex on a particular 
occasion.65 
In the early 1970s, feminist organizations and law enforcement 
agencies argued that allowing the accused to introduce evidence 
about the victim's sexual history was unjustifiable.66 They argued 
that: (1) sexual morality had changed since the adoption of the 
common-law doctrine which allowed evidence about the victim's 
unchaste character;67 (2) exclusionary laws are needed to protect 
"complainants from a 'second rape' in the courtroom"68; and (3) 
rape shield laws would attempt to balance "gender-bias in the de­
termination of consent. "69 
62. Galvin, supra note 6, at 765 n.3. Michigan enacted the first rape shield statute 
in 1974. Id. 
63. Richard A. Wayman, Note, Lucas Comes to Visit Iowa: Balancing Interests 
Under Iowa's Rape-Shield Evidentiary Rule, 77 IOWA L. REv. 865,869-70 (1992) (dis­
cussing the history of rape shield statutes). See also Alison Ray Bunch, Rape Shield, 
Survey ofDevelopments in North Carolina and the Fourth Circuit, 1993.72 N.C. L. REV. 
1777 (1994) ("before the advent of rape shield laws, the moral character of victims ... 
was often an issue"). 
64. Cheryl Siskin, Note, No. The "Resistance Not Required" Statute and "Rape 
Shield Law" May Not Be Enough-Commonwealth v. Berkowitz. 609 A.2d /338 (Pa. 
Super. Ct.) (per curiam), alloc. granted, 613 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1992),66 TEMP. L. REV. 531, 
557 ("rape shield law was enacted to quell the myth that unchaste women were liars"). 
65. Galvin, supra note 6, at 808. 
66. Wayman, supra note 63, at 871. 
67. Id. at 871-72. "Research indicated the vast majority of young women ... 
engaged in consensual sexual relations outside of marriage, and men found this behav­
ior normal and acceptable." Id. (citations omitted). 
68. Lara English Simmons, Note, Michigan v. Lucas: Failing to Define the State 
Interest in Rape Shield Legislation, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1592, 1604 (1992) (discussing the 
movement to eliminate the common-law doctrine allowing evidence of a woman's un­
chaste character). Proponents of rape shield laws argue that victims suffer embarrass­
ment and humiliation, causing psychological damage to. the victim's self-esteem. Id. 
69. Id. This is a problem particularly when a sexual assault victim reacts passively 
rather than resisting. Id. at 1604-05. 
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As a result of the rape law reformers' efforts, Michigan enacted 
the first rape shield statute in 1974.70 By 1978, over thirty states 
had adopted rape shield statutes.71 In 1978, Congress followed suit 
by enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which provides generally 
that evidence of an alleged victim's sexual history is inadmissible.72 
Despite this general rule, Rule 412 allows evidence of: specific in­
stances of the victim's past sexual conduct with the accused to show 
that the victim consented;73 specific instances of the victim's sexual 
conduct with a person other than the accused when introduced to 
show that the accused was not the source of semen or injury;74 and 
specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct when the Constitu­
tion requires it to be admitted.75 In addition, Rule 412 requires the 
accused to make a written motion, at least fifteen days before the 
trial, to offer evidence under one of the aforementioned excep­
tions.76 Thereafter, the judge must conduct a hearing in his cham­
bet:S to determine whether the evidence is admissible.77 
Congress's principal purpose in enacting Rule 412 was to end 
the "degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details 
about" the victims' private lives.78 Further, President Jimmy Carter 
felt that the law would be helpful in encouraging women to report 
rapes by ending the public degradation and humiliation of rape vic­
timS.79 Congress recognized that allowing defendants to examine 
70. Galvin, supra note 6, at 765 n.3. 
71. 124 CoNG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). 
72. FED. R. EVID. 412. Rule 412 states: 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a 
person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, reputation 
or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such 
rape or assault is not admissible. (b) ... evidence of a victim's past sexual 
behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, un­
less ... (I) admitted in accordance with ... (c)(I) and (c)(2) and is constitu­
tionally required ... ; or (2) admitted in accordance with ... (c) and is 
evidence of- (A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused 
offered by the accused, upon the issue of whether the accused was ... the 
source of semen or injury; or (B) past sexual behavior with the accused ... . 
Id. For law review treatment of Rule 412, see Paul Nicholas Monnin, Note, Proving 
Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual Harassment 
Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule ofEvidence 412, 48 VAND. L. REv. 
1155 (1995). 
73. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(B). 

'74. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A). 

75. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(I). 
76. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(I). 
77. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(2). 
78. 124 CoNG. REc. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann). 
79. Statement by President Carter on Signing H.R. 4727 into Law, Protection for 
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the victim's sexual history contributed to the fact that rape is the 
least reported crime.80 
Since Congress enacted Rule 412, all but two states have en­
acted rape shield statutes.81 Rape shield statutes generally fall into 
one of four categories.82 The first category is the Michigan model, 
which about half of the states follow.83 The Michigan model gener­
ally excludes all evidence of a victim's sexual history, but allows 
limited exceptions to this rule.84 The second model for rape shield 
the Privacy of Rape Victims, II PUB. PAPERS: Jimmy Carter 1902 (Oct. 30, 1978). See 
also Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey January 1, 1993 ­
December 31, 1993,45 MERCER L. REv. 1291, 1297 (1994) (noting that "many rape 
victims would never report their attackers if defendants were routinely allowed to 
showcase the victim's prior sexual activity"). 
80. 124 CONGo REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). Representative 
Holtzman stated: 
Too often in this country victims of rape are humiliated and harassed 
when they report and prosecute the rape. Bullied and cross-examined about 
their prior sexual experiences, many find the trial almost as degrading as the 
rape itself .... [I]t is not surprising that ... [rape] is the least reported crime. 
Id. 
81. Daniel Lowery, Note, The Sixth Amendment, the Preclusionary Sanction, and 
Rape Shield Laws: Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991),61 U. CiN. L. REV. 297. 
309 (1992) (discussing the history of rape shield statutes). Forty seven states have rape 
shield statutes in effect after Tennessee repealed its rape shield statute. TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 40-17-119 (1990) (repealed by Acts 1991, ch. 273, § 34). The two states that 
have not passed rape shield statutes are Utah and Arizona. Lowery, supra, at 309 n.76. 
However, Arizona courts have created a judicial equivalent to the rape shield statute. 
Id. Arizona created its judicial equivalent in State ex rei. Pope V. Superior Court, 545 
P.2d 946, 953 (Ariz. 1976). For a list of all of the applicable state and federal statutes, 
see Lowery, supra, at 309. 
82. Lowery, supra note 81, at 313-14. 
83. Id. States that follow the Michigan Model include: Alabama (ALA. CODE 
§ 12-21-203 (1995»; Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2)-(5) (West Supp. 1996)); Illi­
nois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995»; Indiana (IND. 
CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (West 1986»; Kentucky (Ky. R. EVID. 412); Louisiana (LA. 
CODE EVID ANN. art. 412 (West 1995»; Maine (ME. R. EVID. 412); Maryland (MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1992)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 21B 
(1994»; Michigan (MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991»; Minnesota 
(MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(3), (4), (6) (West Supp. 1996»; Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1996»; Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(2), (3) 
(1995»; Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321 (1989»; New Hampshire (N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1995»; North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-l, R. 412 
(1993»; Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D)-(F) (Baldwin 1994»; Pennsylvania 
(PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (1983»; South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 
(Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1995»; Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 
1995»; Virginia (VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Michie 1988»; West Virginia (W. VA. 
CODE § 61-8B-ll (1992»; and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2) (West 1985 & 
Supp. 1995». Lowery, supra note 81, at 313 n.BB. 
84. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991). These exceptions include 
evidence of the victim's "past sexual conduct with the actor" and "[ e ]vidence of specific 
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statutes is the Arkansas mode1.85 The Arkansas model provides for 
an in camera hearing, at which the judge weighs the probative value 
of admitting the evidence of the victim's sexual history against the 
likelihood and degree of prejudice.86 
The third species of rape shield statute is modeled after Fed­
eral Rule of Evidence 412.87 Like the Michigan model, the federal 
model renders evidence of an alleged victim's sexual history inad­
missible, subject to limited exceptions.88 However, the federal 
model differs from the Michigan model in that it contains a broad 
exception for instances where prohibiting the accused from intro­
ducing evidence of the victim's sexual history would violate the ac­
cused's constitutional rights.89 The final type of rape shield statute 
is the California mode1.90 The California model allows evidence of 
the alleged victim's sexual history to be introduced for certain is-
instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or dis­
ease." § 750.52Oj(I)(a), (b). However, to allow sexual history evidence under one of 
these exceptions, the judge must first find that the "evidence is material to a fact at 
issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its 
probative value." § 750.520j(1). 
85. Lowery, supra note 81, at 313. States which follow the Arkansas model in­
clude: Alaska (ALASKA. STAT. § 12.45.045 (1995»; Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16­
42-101 (Michie 1994»; Colorado (CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (West 1990 & 
Supp. 1995»; Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1987»; Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21­
3525 (1995»; New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7 (West 1995»; New Mexico (N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16 (Michie 1994»; Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 
(1994»; South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15 (1995»; Texas (TEX. R. 
CRIM. EVID. 412); and Wyoming (WYo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1988». Lowery, supra note 
81, at 313 n.89. 
86. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101 (Michie 1994). 
87. Lowery, supra note 81, at 314. Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86f 
(1994», Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1995», Hawaii (HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 626-1, R. 412 (1995», Iowa (IOWA R. EVID. 412), New York (N.Y. CRIM. PRoe. LAW 
§ 60.42 (McKinney 1992», and Oregon (OR. REv. STAT. § 40.210 (1988» as well as the 
military (MIL. R. EVID. 412), have based their rape shield laws on the federal model. 
Lowery, supra note 81, at 314 n.90. 
88. FED. R. EVID. 412. For a discussion of the exceptions to the rape shield stat­
utes modeled after Rule 412, see supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
89. FED. R. EVID. 412. 
90. Lowery, supra note 81, at 314. States which follow the California model in­
clude: California (CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1l03(b) (West Supp. 1995»; Delaware 
(DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508,3509 (1995»; Mississippi (MISS. R. EVID. 412); North 
Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-14, -15 (1985»; and Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 2412 (West Supp. 1996». These statutes allow evidence of the victim's 
sexual history so long as it is not introduced to show the victim consented. Lowery, 
supra note 81, at 314 n.92. Nevada (NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (Michie 
Supp. 1995» and Washington (WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.0202(2)-(4) (West 
1988» exclude evidence of the victim's sexual conduct when introduced only to show 
the victim's lack of credibility. Lowery, supra note 81, at 314 n.92. 
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sues, but not for others.91 
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly declared any 
of the foregoing rape shield models constitutional, the Court implic­
itly approved rape shield statutes in Michigan v. Lucas.92 In Lucas, 
the defendant was charged with rape. He failed to provide written 
notice within ten days of the trial that he intended to present evi­
dence about the victim's sexual conduct as required by the Michi­
gan rape shield statute under a statutory exception.93 At trial, the 
court denied the defendant's request to admit evidence about the 
alleged victim's sexual history, since he had not satisfied the notice 
requirement. Subsequently, the judge, in a bench trial, found the 
defendant guilty.94 
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the judge's decision. 
It ruled that Michigan's notice-and-hearing requirement violated 
the Sixth Amendment per se.95 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme 
Court found that the notice~and-hearing requirement was not un­
constitutional per se, and remanded the case to the Michigan Court 
of Appeals for a determination of whether the requirement was un­
constitutional under the circumstances.96 ' 
The Court recognized that a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
rights may be restricted by other legitimate interests, so long as 
such restrictions are neither arbitrary nor" 'disproportionate to the 
purposes they are designed to serve."'97 The court emphasized that 
Michigan's rape shield statute is such "a valid legislative determina­
tion that rape victims deserve heightened protection against sur­
prise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy."98 In so 
holding, the Supreme Court implicitly approved the constitutional­
91. See CAL EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(b) (West Supp. 1995). See supra note 90 
for a discussion of the issues for which evidence of the victim's sexual history can be 
introduced. 
92. 500 U.S. 145, 149-51 (1991) (notice provision of the Michigan rape shield stat­
ute is not contrary to the Sixth Amendment per se because it is consistent with the 
purpose of rape shield statutes). For law review treatment of Lucas, see Jack M. Mor­
gan, Jr., Note, Michigan v. Lucas: Rape Shields, Criminal Discovery Rules, and the Price 
We Pay in Pursuit o/the Truth, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 545 (1993); Simmons, supra note 68, 
at 1592. 
93. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 147. 
94. Id. at 147-48. 
95. Id. at 148. The Michigan Court of Appeals declared that Michigan's notice­
and-hearing requirement served no useful purpose and was insufficient to justify inter­
ference with the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment compulsory process rights. Id. 
96. Id. at 153. 
97. Id. at 149, 151 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,56 (1987». 
98. Id. at 149-50. 
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ity of rape shield statutes.99 
2. 	 Case Law in Opposition to Courts Interpreting Rape 
Shield Statutes to Exclude Evidence About the 
Victim's Motive to Fabricate 
Several courts have confronted the issue of the accused's right 
to present relevant testimony about the victim's sexual history as it 
relates to the victim's motive to fabricate sexual assault charges.1°o 
99. Id. Although the Supreme Court did not expressly approve rape shield stat­
utes, it is a reasonable inference to believe that the Court would have found that rape 
shield statutes were constitutional if faced with that issue. The Supreme Court noted 
that a legitimate interest may restrict a defendant's right to present relevant testimony 
so long as such a restriction is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to its designated 
purpose. Id. at 149, 151 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987}). Further, 
the court held that Michigan's rape shield statute served the legitimate interest of pro­
tecting rape victims from "surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy." 
Id. at 149-50. Therefore, one can argue that rape shield statutes can restrict the defend­
ant's right to present evidence as long as such a restriction is neither arbitrary nor dis­
proportionate to its designated purpose. See also B.J. George, Jr., United States 
Supreme Court 1990-1991 Term: Criminal Procedure Highlights, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
535,552-54 (1991) (discussing the constitutionality of rape shield legislation in light of 
Lucas); Sloan K. Banfield, Casenote, Judicial Manipulation of Michigan's Rape Shield 
Act?!: People v. Wilhem, 9 COOLEY L. REv. 497, 505 (1992) (noting that the Lucas 
Court found rape shield statute's notice requirement to serve the legitimate state inter­
est of protecting against surprise, harassment, and undue delay); Christopher B. Reid, 
Note, The Sexual Innocence Inference Theory as a Basis for the Admissibility ofa Child 
Molestation Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct, 91 MICH. L. REv. 827, 837-38 (1993) (quot­
ing Lucas for the point that rape shield statutes are not unconstitutional simply because 
they prevent the defendant from introducing relevant evidence). 
100. United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that, 
although "[t]he right to confront witnesses includes the right to ... show their possible 
bias or self-interest in testifying," the defendant's evidence was not relevant to the vic­
tim's motive to fabricate), cert. denied, 112 S. Q. 1598 (1992); United States v. Nez, 661 
F.2d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting that the motive to fabricate is always a proper 
subject for examination, although the defendant could not characterize the evidence as 
such for the first time on appeal); United States v. Williams, 37 M.J. 352, 359-60 
(C.M.A. 1993) (holding that newly discovered evidence relating to the victim's motive 
to fabricate would have been admissible); Lewis v. State, 591 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1991) 
(the lower court erred in excluding evidence because it was introduced to show that the 
victim had a motive to fabricate); State v. Parker, 730 P.2d 921, 925 (Idaho 1986) (vic­
tim's motive to fabricate is always an issue, and exclusion of evidence about the victim's 
belief that she was pregnant was erroneous); White v. State, 598 A.2d 187, 193-94 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (evidence of victim's sexual history offered to show that victim had 
a motive to fabricate was not related to her possible motive to fabricate); Common­
wealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181, 186-87 (Mass. 1981) (evidence of prior acts may be 
relevant to show motive to fabricate in certain circumstances as in this case where vic­
tim had previously been arrested for prostitution and might have lied to avoid arrest); 
People v. LaLone 437 N.W.2d 611, 621 (Mich. 1989) (Archer, J., concurring in part) 
(trial court did not err in excluding evidence of victim's sexual history as it related to 
her motive to fabricate because such motive could be sufficiently established by other 
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All of these courts have recognized that the defendant has a right to 
cross-examine a witness about her motive to fabricate. 101 Many of 
these courts have held that the policy interests behind rape shield 
statutes cannot justify restricting the defendant's right to examine 
the victim's motive to fabricate. 102 In fact, United States courts of 
appeals have held that the defendant may introduce relevant sexual 
history evidence to examine a victim's motive to fabricate. 103 How­
ever, these cases refused to allow the defendant to introduce the 
evidence on alternative grounds.104 Therefore, this section dis­
cusses other federal and state cases that better support the view 
that courts should not interpret rape shield statutes to exclude evi­
dence showing the victim's motive to fabricate. 
Courts that interpret rape shield statutes to allow sexual his­
tory evidence related to the victim's motive to fabricate recognize 
the potentially devastating nature of motive to fabricate evi­
dence.1os In United States v. Williams,106 the Court of Military Ap­
peals held that the military judge did not consider the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment rights when it denied the defendant's motion to 
reopen the case on grounds of newly discovered evidence.107 The 
defendant sought to introduce newly discovered evidence that the 
victim had been involved in an extramarital affair and had fabri­
cated the rape charges against the defendant to prevent her lover 
from discovering her further infidelity. This discovery could have 
caused him to end his relationship with her. lOS 
evidence); State v. Rogers, 642 A.2d 932 (N.H. 1994) (trial court properly limited testi­
mony of victim's sexual history to its relation to her motive to fabricate); State v. Jalo, 
557 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (concluding that, as in Davis v. Alaska, 415 
U.S. 308 (1974), policy considerations must give way to the defendant's Sixth Amend­
ment rights to examine witness for bias); Winfield v. Commonwealth, 301 S.E.2d 15, 21 
(Va. 1983) (noting that rape shield statute provides for exception when evidence is ad­
vanced to show the victim's motive to fabricate). 
101. See, e.g., Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469; Nez, 661 F.2d at 1206; Williams, 37 M.J. at 
360; Lewis, 591 So. 2d at 925; Parker, 730 P.2d at 925; White, 598 A.2d at 192-93; Joyce, 
415 N.E.2d at 186; LaLone, 437 N.W.2d at 621; Rogers, 642 A.2d at 934-35; Jalo, 557 
P.2d at 1362; Winfield, 301 S.E.2d at 21. 
102. See, e.g., Nez, 661 F.2d at 1206; Williams, 37 M.J. at 360; Lewis, 591 So.2d at 
925; Parker, 730 P.2d at 925; Joyce, 415 N.E.2d at 186-87; Jalo, 557 P.2d at 1362; Win­
field, 301 S.E.2d at 21. 
103. See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1466-69; Nez, 661 F.2d at 1206. 
104. Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469 (defendant's proffered evidence was not relevant to 
the victim'S motive to fabricate); Nez, 661 F.2d at 1206 (defendant precluded from rais­
ing issue for first time on appeal). 
105. E.g., Williams, 37 M.J. at 360-61. 
106. 37 M.J. 352 (C.M.A. 1993). 
107. Id. at 361. 
108. Id. at 355. 
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One of the judge's reasons for excluding the evidence was that 
it would not have been admissible under the military rape shield 
statute.109 In partial reliance upon Olden v. Kentucky, the Court of 
Military Appeals held that the military judge abused his discretion 
by denying the defendant's request to present evidence relating to 
the victim's motive to fabricate. 110 It reasoned that had the judge 
allowed the evidence, it would have had a devastating impact upon 
the victim's credibility.ll1 
Courts also realize that the accused's defense could be compro­
mised if he is not allowed to examine a witness's motive to fabricate 
by introducing sexual history evidence.112 In Commonwealth v. 
Joyce,113 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the 
trial court improperly excluded evidence about the alleged victim's 
motive to fabricate.11 4 The police found the alleged victim and the 
accused naked outside a car in a vacant parking 10t.115 At trial, the 
defendant wanted to introduce evidence that the alleged victim had 
been found in similar situations on two prior occasions that resulted 
in her arrest for prostitution.116 The defendant sought to introduce 
this evidence to show that the alleged victim might have lied to 
avoid more trouble with the police.!17 
The trial judge held that evidence of the alleged victim's arrests 
for prostitution was barred by the Massachusetts rape shield stat­
ute. llS In reversing the trial judge's decision, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts stated that rape shield statutes cannot be 
interpreted to abridge the defendant's right to show motive or 
bias.119 The court stressed that "the right to cross-examine a com­
plainant in a rape case to show a false accusation may be the last 
refuge of an innocent defendant. "120 
Courts usually employ the reasoning of Olden v. Kentucky and 
Davis v. Alaska in interpreting rape shield statutes to allow sexual 
109. Id. at 359. 
110. Id. at 360-61. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988). 
111. Williams, 37 M.J. at 360-61. 
112. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Mass. 1981). 
113. 415 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1981). 




118. Id. at 184. 
119. Id. at 186. 
120. Id. 
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history evidence related to the victim's motive to fabricate. l21 In 
Lewis v. State,122 the Florida Supreme Court held that the trial 
court erred by excluding evidence that was offered to show that the 
victim accused the defendant, her stepfather, of sexual assault to 
stop him from telling the victim's mother about her sexual activity 
with a third person.123 The Florida Supreme Court cited Olden v. 
Kentucky and Davis v. Alaska in support of its holding.124 The 
court stated that rape shield statutes "must give way to the defend­
ant's constitutional rights."125 
Williams ,Joyce, and Lewis illustrate the types of reasons courts 
use to exclude sexual history evidence related to the victim's motive 
to fabricate. Courts interpret rape shield statutes to allow sexual 
history evidence related to the victim's motive to fabricate because: 
motive to fabricate evidence can have a devastating effect on the 
victim's credibility; it is necessary to the accused's defense: and the 
reasoning of Olden and Davis support the defendant's right to ex­
amine a victim's motive to fabricate. 
3. 	 Case Law in Support of Courts Interpreting Rape Shield 
Statutes to Exclude Evidence About the Victim's 
Motive to Fabricate 
Williams, Joyce, and Lewis exemplify the reasoning that courts 
employ to hold that rape shield statutes cannot restrict the defend­
ant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate.126 However, 
other courts exclude evidence of a victim's sexual history when in­
troduced for the purpose of showing that the victim had a motive to 
fabricateP7 
121. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 591 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1991). See also Olden v. 
Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988), discussed supra at notes 50-59 and accompanying text; 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), discussed supra at notes 39-49 and accompanying 
text. 
122. 591 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1991). 
123. Id. at 923. 
124. Id. at 925. 
125. Id. 
126. See United States v. Williams, 37 M.J. 352 (C.M.A. 1993); Lewis, 591 So. 2d 
at 922-926; Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1981). 
127. See, e.g., Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cert. de­
nied, 115 S. Ct. 57 (1994); Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1550 (9th Cir. 1992) (fact that 
victim posed nude for magazines and acted in pornographic movies did not show that 
she had a motive to fabricate); United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 
1991) (holding sanitized version of story involving victim's punishment for episode of 
"heavy petting" and resulting motive to fabricate was enough to satisfy the defendant's 
right to confront adverse witnesses), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1598 (1992); Wright v. State, 
513 A.2d 1310, 1314-15 (Del. 1986) (no sufficient factual basis to show that victim had 
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Courts that exclude sexual history evidence even when it re­
lates to the victim's motive to fabricate find that the policies of rape 
shield statutes and the fact that defendants can usually establish the 
victim's motive without sexual history evidence justify such exclu­
sions. l28 In Stephens v. Miller,129 the victim and the accused told 
two entirely different stories about what had occurred on the night 
of the alleged attempted sexual assault. 130 In the accused's version, 
he claimed that the victim fabricated the charge of rape because 
statements that he made angered her. The defendant asserted that 
he and the victim were engaged in "doggy fashion" sexual inter­
course.131 During this alleged sexual act, the defendant asked the 
alleged victim if she enjoyed sex in that manner and the defendant 
indicated that a friend told the defendant that she did. In addition, 
the defendant claimed that he commented about switching part­
ners.132 The defendant claimed these statements angered the al­
leged victim so much that she withdrew her consent to the sexual 
intercourse and fabricated the attempted rape charges. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
quoted Michigan v. Lucas in declaring that rape shield statutes 
serve the legitimate interest of protecting the victim from "surprise, 
motive to fabricate based on her possible fear that she was pregnant from sexual inter­
course with her boyfriend on the previous day), affd, 616 A.2d 1215 (1992); Snyder v. 
State, 410 S.E.2d 173, 176 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (trial court did not commit error in 
refusing to admit evidence about the victim's sexual history introduced to show that the 
victim had a motive to lie); People v. Hodges, 636 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ill. App. Ct.) (evi­
dence that victim lied to prevent husband from discovering adulterous lifestyle was ir­
relevant to her alleged motive to fabricate, because person who wished conduct to go 
unnoticed would not draw attention to self by telling the police about it), appeal denied, 
622 N.E.2d 1217 (Ill. 1993); State v. Zuniga, 703 P.2d 805, 809-10 (Kan. 1985) (fact that 
victim was pregnant by man other than husband was not relevant to her possible motive 
to fabricate, since she had received a tubal ligation and had no way to know that she 
was pregnant at the time of the offense); White v. State, 598 A.2d 187, 193 (Md. 1991) 
(holding that evidence that victim had previously offered sex for drugs was not reason­
ably related to her motive to fabricate); People v. LaLone, 437 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Mich. 
1989) (Archer, J., concurring in part) (court's exclusion of evidence that stepfather's 
punishment of victim for sex-related incidents for purpose of showing motive to fabri­
cate did not violate rights of confrontation). 
128. Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1002. 
129. 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cen. denied, 115 S. Ct. 57 (1994). 
130. Id. at 1000-01. The victim claimed that she awoke in the living room of her 
trailer and found the defendant standing by the front door. Id. at 1000. The victim 
further claims that thereafter, the defendant tried to force himself on the victim. Before 
he was able to remove his pants, the victim broke free and ran to a room occupied by 
her sister and brother-in-law. The defendant then fled the apartment. Id. 
131. Id. at 1000. 
132. Id. 
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harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy."133 The court 
concluded, therefore, that rape shield statutes may restrict the de­
fendant's right to present testimony if such a restriction is neither 
arbitrary nor disproportionate to its intended purpose. l34 
The court of appeals noted that the trial court allowed the de­
fendant to testify that he had said something to the victim which 
had angered her. In addition, the court of appeals emphasized that 
the proposed testimony was the "kind of generalized inquiry into 
the reputation or past sexual conduct of the victim" that causes the 
precise type of embarrassment and public denigration that rape 
shield statutes were enacted to prevent.135 In light of these findings, 
the court of appeals held that the trial court's decision to restrict the 
proposed evidence was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to 
the rape shield statute's designated purposes.136 
Other courts exclude motive to fabricate evidence on relevancy 
grounds.137 In People v. Hodges,138 the Appellate Court of Illinois 
also excluded evidence about the victim's sexual history as it related 
to the victim's motive to fabricate. 139 The defendant sought to in­
troduce evidence that the victim had previously failed to pursue 
charges against a man whom the victim claimed had raped her.140 
The defendant's theory behind his desire to introduce this evidence 
was that the victim had falsely accused the other man and the de­
fendant in order to hide her adulterous lifestyle from her husband 
who was serving in the armed forces. 141 
The court relied upon the doctrine of relevance to exclude the 
defendant's proffered evidence.142 The court did not accept the de­
fendant's argument that the rape charges were part of the victim's 
scheme to hide her sexual relations from her husband. It reasoned 
that "an individual who wishes for something to go unnoticed usu­
ally does not call attention to it."143 
133. Id. at 1002 (citing Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991)). See supra 
notes 92-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lucas. 
134. Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1002 (citing Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149-50; Rock v. Arkan­
sas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987)). See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of Rock. 
135. Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1002. 
136. Id. at 1002-03. 
137. See, e.g., People v. Hodges, 636 N.E.2d 638,640 (III. App. Ct. 1993). 
138. 636 N.E.2d 638, 640 (III. App. Ct. 1993). 
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Stephens and Hodges illustrate the types of reasons that courts 
use to interpret rape shield statutes to exclude evidence relating to 
the victim's motive to fabricate. Courts interpret rape shield stat­
utes to exclude evidence relating to the victim's motive to fabricate 
because: it is necessary to accomplish the goals of rape shield stat­
utes; sometimes the defendant can establish the victim's motive to 
lie without referring to the sexual history evidence; and sometimes 
the sexual history evidence is not probative on the issue of the vic­
tim's motive to lie. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Criminal defendants generally have the right to present rele­
vant testimony in their own behalf.144 In fact, the right to present 
relevant testimony in one's behalf is a "fundamental element of due 
process of law."145 This includes the right to examine a witness's 
motive to fabricate.146 
However, the criminal defendant's right to present relevant 
testimony in his or her own behalf may be limited by other legiti­
mate interests so long as the restriction is neither arbitrary nor dis­
proportionate to the purpose the restriction was designed to 
serve.147 Shielding rape victims from "surprise, harassment, and 
unnecessary invasions of privacy" caused by the criminal defend­
ant's unjustified examination of the victim's sexual history repre­
sents such a legitimate interest.148 Thus, the pertinent inquiry in 
resolving this conflict is whether the benefit gained by advancing 
the interests of rape shield statutes is arbitrary and disproportionate 
when compared to the detrimental effect on the defendant's right to 
examine a witness's motive to fabricate. 
Part A.1 of this section weighs the privacy interests protected 
by rape shield statutes against the defendant's right to examine a 
witness's motive to fabricate. Part A.2 balances the effect that rape 
shield statutes have on encouraging women to report sexual as­
144. E.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 
157,164 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14,17-19 (1967). See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of Rock and supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of Washington. 
145. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19. 
146. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988) (per curiam); Davis v. Alaska, 
415 U.S. 308,319-20 (1974). 
147. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Rock. 
148. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991). See supra notes 92-99 and ac­
companying text for a discussion of Lucas. 
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saults against the defendant's rights to examine a witness's motive 
to lie. Part A.3 weighs the rape shield statutes' role in balancing 
gender bias in the court room against the defendant's right to ex­
amine the witness's motive to fabricate. Part A.4 considers all of 
these factors together. In addition, Part A.4 concludes that, gener­
ally, interpreting rape shield statutes to exclude evidence relating to 
the victim's motive to fabricate is arbitrary and disproportionate to 
the interests they were designed to serve. Part B of this section 
discusses how courts can use existing rules of evidence to dull the 
effect that this conclusion has on rape shield statutes. 
A. Weighing the Competing Interests 
- . 
1. 	 Privacy Interests Versus Defendant's Constitutional 
Rights 
The United States Supreme Court held in Davis v. Alaska that 
the restriction upon the defendant's right to cross-examine a wit­
ness about the witness's motive to fabricate was disproportionate to 
its intended purpose.149 In Davis, the intended purpose in restrict­
ing the defendant's proffered evidence was to protect the confiden­
tiality of a juvenile witness's criminal record.150 The Supreme 
Court listed some of the privacy interests protected by juvenile-rec­
ord protection statutes.151 First,. they prevent impairment of the 
juvenile's rehabilitation process.152 In addition, juvenile-record 
protection statutes ensure that the juvenile will not lose employ­
ment opportunities.153 Also, they discourage juveniles from com­
mitting further crimes.154 Finally, juvenile-record protection stat­
utes allow a juvenile to testify free from embarrassment and with­
out loss to her reputation.155 
Much like the privacy interests balanced by the Supreme Court 
in Davis, rape shield statutes protect the privacy interests of the 
149. Olden, 488 U.S. at 231. See also Davis, 415 U.S. at 320-21. See supra notes 
50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Olden and supra notes 39-49 and ac­
companying text for a discussion of Davis. 
150. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320. 
151. Id. at 319-20. 
152. Jd. at 319. 
153. Jd. 
154. See id. The Court did not elaborate on exactly how juvenile-record protec­
tion statutes discourage a juvenile from committing future acts. A reasonable inference 
is that if you do not remind a juvenile that he has acted like a criminal, he is more likely 
to behave like a law abiding citizen. 
155. Id. 
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victim.156 Courts and legislatures have found that rape shield stat­
utes protect the privacy interests of sexual assault victims.157 Rape 
shield statutes accomplish this goal by helping to end the "degrad­
ing and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details" about the vic­
tims' private lives.158 In this way, rape shield statutes prevent the 
victim from suffering any unnecessary psychological damage or loss 
of self esteem.159 One writer has gone as far as saying that the pri­
vacy interest advanced by rape shield statutes is necessary to pro­
tect the victim from suffering a second rape on the witness stand 
during trial. l60 Both rape shield statutes and juvenile-record pro­
tection statutes preserve the privacy rights of the respective par­
ties.161 The United States Supreme Court held in Davis v. Alaska 
that the privacy interests advanced by juvenile record protection 
statutes could not justify restricting the defendant's right to ex­
amine a witness's motive to fabricate.162 Therefore, Davis seems to 
control the resolution of this issue.163 However, before deciding 
that Davis controls, one must determine that the privacy interests 
protected by rape shield statutes and juvenile record-protection 
statutes are sufficiently similar. 
Rape shield statutes might protect more important privacy in­
terests than juvenile-record protection statutes for several reasons. 
First, rape trials are very traumatic for the victim.l64 Attacks on the 
victim's credibility by way of sexual history evidence, evidence 
about her clothes, evidence about her demeanor around the de­
fendant, and similar evidence can make the victim feel like she is on 
trial.165 Rape shield statutes attempt to eliminate the prospect of 
156. 124 CoNG. REc. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann). 
157. Michigan v. Lucas. 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991). See supra notes 92-99 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Lucas. 
158. 124 CONGo REc. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann). See also Lucas, 
500 U.S. at 149-50 (rape shield statute is "a valid legislative determination that rape 
victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary 
invasions of privacy"). 
159. Simmons, supra note 68, at 1604. 
160. [d. 
161. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,319 (1974). See also Lucas, 500 U.S. at 
149-50. 
162. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320. 
163. [d. 
164. ANN WOLBERT BURGESS & LYNDA LYTLE HOMSTROM, RAPE: VICTIMS OF 
CRISIS 197-219 (1974) (describing factors which make trial traumatic for sexual assault 
victim); Rene I. Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. FAM. L. 559, 575 
(1991) (noting the traumatic nature of rape trial for women). 
165. See Leslie Griffin, The Lawyer's Dirty Hands, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219, 
229 (1995) (noting that the victims are usually on trial in rape cases); Alinor C. Sterling, 
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the victim becoming the defendant in the trial.166 By protecting the 
victim's sexual privacy, the whole process may be less traumatic for 
her.167 
The privacy interests of rape shield statutes may also be more 
important because of the legality of the conduct involved. Juvenile 
record protection statutes protect examination of illegal behavior. 
Alternatively, rape shield statutes protect behavior that is either not 
contrary to the law or not enforced. While committing a crime is 
widely recognized as wrong, engaging in sexual conduct is socially 
acceptable. Examining a rape victim's sexual history may make her 
feel like she has done something wrong by having sex. Since rape 
shield statutes prevent the examination of legitimate behavior 
which may have the effect of illegitimizing the behavior, rape shield 
statutes may encompass a more important privacy right. 
In addition, the privacy interests protected by rape shield stat~ 
utes may be more important because the victim's conduct is gener~ 
ally not already public knowledge. Although juvenile criminal 
proceedings are closed to the public, the juvenile witness's conduct 
has been examined by others in some sort of forum.168 Further, the 
police must have investigated the juvenile witness's behavior before 
he or she could be prosecuted. 
Undressing the Victim: The Intersection of Evidentiary and Semiotic Meanings of Wo­
men's Clothing in Rape Trials, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 87,123·24 (1995) (discussing 
rape law reform and evidence regarding a woman's clothes); Rachel M. Capoccia, Note, 
Piercing the Veil of Tears: The Admission of Rape Crisis Counselor Records in Acquain­
tance Rape Trials, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1335, 1344 (1995) ("it appeared to most observers 
that the rape victim was the one on trial rather than the defendant"). 
166. Newell H. Blakely, Article IV: Relevancy and Its Limits, 30 Hous. L. REV. 
281,478-79 (1993) ("Much of the momentum leading to nearly universal implementa­
tion of rape shield laws was the concern that the vast majority of sexual assaults suf­
fered by women went unreported partly because of victims' fears that they themselves 
would be placed on trial by the defense."); David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 329 (1995) ("rape shield 
laws were intended to end the practice of putting victims on trial"). 
167. Richard D. Friedman, Evidentiary Rules and Rulings: The Role of Treatises, 
25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 885, 885·86 (1992) ("rape shield laws not only keep out evidence 
of great potential prejudice and dubious probative value, but also protect the privacy of 
complaining witnesses [and] limit the possibility of a renewed trauma") (footnotes 
omitted); Lisa M. Dillman, Note, Stephens v. Miller: Restoration of the Rape Defend­
ant's Sixth Amendment Rights, 28 IND. L. REV. 97,113 (1994) ("In the quest for a fair 
and less traumatic rape trial for victims, the rape shield statute was intended to eradi­
cate the traditional misconceptions of rape which held that victims were 'asking for 
't ''')1 ..... 
168. Brian R. Suffredini, Note, Juvenile Gunslingers: A Place for Punitive Philoso­
phy in Rehabilitative Juvenile Justice, 35 B.C. L. REv. 885,890 (1994) (noting aspects of 
juvenile criminal justice system). 
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On the other hand, the rape victim was never tried or investi­
gated for her prior sexual behavior because it is not a crime or it is 
not enforced. Since the victim's sexual history is more private than 
the juvenile's criminal behavior, her interest in protecting that 
information may be more important. In the foregoing ways, the 
privacy interests protected by rape shield statutes may be more im­
portant than the privacy interests protected by juvenile-record pro­
tection statutes. 
However, the privacy interests protected by rape shield stat­
utes are more similar than dissimilar to the privacy interests pro­
tected by juvenile-record protection statutes. Both statutes exclude 
information that the party in question would rather remain un­
known.169 If the information becomes known, the party in question 
would be embarrassed and humiliated in front of, at. a minimum, a 
courtroom of people po The adjudication of the juvenile's conduct 
does not change the fact that he or she does not want that informa­
tion to be disseminated. 
In addition, just because rape trials are traumatic for rape vic­
tims does not make the privacy interests protected by rape shield 
statutes more important. The very nature of rape trials makes them 
traumatic for the victim.l7l She has to recall all of the intricate de­
tails of a devastating event. A rape victim will probably not be sub­
stantially less traumatized if the defense is allowed to examine only 
her sexual conduct that is relevant to the victim's motive to 
fabricate. 
Moreover, juvenile record-protection statutes serve privacy in­
terests that rape shield statutes do not serve. First, juvenile record­
protection statutes ensure that juveniles do not lose job opportuni­
ties.172 Exposure of a juvenile's criminal behavior at trial might 
lead to discrimination by employers. In addition, exposure of a ju­
venile's criminal history may impair his or her rehabilitation 
processP3 
Further, there may be a greater public stigma attached to being 
a criminal than having participated in sexual conduct. Society is 
169. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991) (rape shield legislation is 
legislative determination that rape victims deserve protection against invasion of pri­
vacy); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U,S. 308,320-21 (1974) (noting juvenile interest in protect­
ing confidentiality of record). 
170. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149-50; Davis, 415 U.S. at 320. 
171. See supra note 164. 
172. Davis, 415 U.S. at 319-20. 
173. Id. 
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now more accepting of a woman's sexual conduct outside· of mar­
riage.174 But members of society still do not want a criminal living 
next door to themP5 
For these reasons, the privacy interests protected by rape 
shield statutes and juvenile record-protection statutes are substan­
tially similar. The United States Supreme Court held in Davis that 
the privacy interests protected by juvenile record protection stat­
utes cannot justify restricting a defendant's right to examine a wit­
ness's motive to fabricateP6 Therefore, the privacy interests 
protected by rape shield statutes also cannot justify restricting the 
defendant's right to examine evidence of a victim's sexual history 
when it relates to her motive to fabricate. 
2. 	 Encouraging Women to Report Crimes Versus the 
Defendant's Constitutional Rights 
In addition to their goal of protecting privacy interests, legisla­
tures enacted rape shield statutes to encourage women to report 
sexual assaults.177 Encouraging sexual assault victims to report 
their attackers is critical because of the magnitude of the sexual as­
sault problem. Approximately one out of every five adult women 
in the United States has been the victim of some form of sexual 
assault.178 Of these sexual assault victims, the FBI estimates that 
only ten percent report their attackers to the pOliceP9 
Further, recent polls show that a surprisingly high percentage 
of college-aged men would rape a woman if they knew that they 
would escape prosecution.180 If women continue to under-report 
174. Wayman, supra note 63, at 871-72. 	 . 
175. Cf. Louis P. DiLorenzo & Darren J. Carroll, The Growing Menace: Violence 
in the Workplace, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 24,26 (1995) (showing prevalence of discrimination 
against criminals by noting necessity of law imposing civil liability on employers who 
discriminate against criminals). 
176. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320. 
177. Statement by President Carter on Signing H.R. 4727 into Law, Protection for 
the Privacy of Rape Victims, II PUB. PAPERS: Jimmy Carter 1902 (Oct. 30, 1978). See 
also Galvin, supra note 6, at 767; Treadwell, supra note 79, at 1297-98. 
178. Susan Quinlan, 'One Strike' for Rapists Isn't Nearly Enough, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 8, 1994, at B7. 
179. [d. 
180. The actual percentage of men who would rape a woman varies upon the 
survey. One article includes a survey of 2,000 college men and reveals that 35% of 
college men "might rape a woman" if they knew that they would not be caught. Daniel 
Goodman, Violence Against Women in Films. N.Y. TIMES. Aug. 28. 1984. at Cl. An­
other article reports a survey of college men that revealed that 51 % of men would rape 
a woman if they could get away with it. Saying 'No' to Sex Advances Never Means 'Yes'. 
BUFFALO NEWS. Apr. 2. 1993. at C2. 
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sexual assaults, more men will feel that they can escape the conse­
quences of their criminal behavior.181 As a result, these men will 
not be deterred from sexually assaulting women.182 However, the 
Supreme Court's holding in Olden v. Kentucky may possibly pre­
vent the "encouraging women to report sexual assaults" rationale 
as a justification for restricting the defendant's right to examine a 
witness's motive to fabricate.183 In Olden, the Supreme Court held 
that the speculative benefit of excluding evidence that the white vic­
tim was living with a black man could not justify restricting the de­
fendant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate.184 Since 
the Supreme Court seemed to emphasize the term "speculative 
benefits," it would seem that any interest with a speculative benefit 
cannot justify abrogating the defendant's right to examine a wit­
ness's motive to fabricate. 
There is nothing speculative about the impact that rape shield 
statutes have on protecting the victim's privacy rights. l85 However, 
the value of rape shield statutes in encouraging women to report 
sexual assaults is speculative at best.186 There is no statistical evi­
dence that rape shield statutes have actually been successful in en­
couraging women to report sexual assaults.187 In fact, there is 
181. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 87 (1973) ("If 
the command of a legal system were not reinforced with the threat of punishment, 
many individuals would see no basis for believing that the legal system really meant 
what it said."). 
182. Id. 
183. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam). 
184. Id. at 231-32. 
185. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991). See supra notes 92-99 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Lucas. 
186. Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the 
Effects of Rape Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI­
NOLOGY 554, 556 & nn.9-10 (1993). The authors of one book conducted an "inter­
rupted time-series analysis for data before and after rape law reforms were 
implemented in Michigan." Id. at 556 n.9. The study found that the number of re­
ported sexual assaults had not risen in Michigan since rape law reforms took effect. Id. 
(citing JEANNE C. MARSH, ET AL., RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM (1982)). 
Other studies have been conducted in California, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, 
Atlanta, Houston, and Washington D.C. Id. at 556 n.lO. Only Detroit and Houston 
showed an increase in the number of reported sexual assaults, and Houston's increase 
was only slight. Id. (citing Julie Horney & Cassia Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instru­
mental Change in Six Urban Jurisdictions, 25 LAW & SOC'y REV. 117, 119-21 (1991)). 
However, this increase may be due to Detroit and Houston enacting comprehensive 
and "extremely zealous [rape law] reforms." See id. at 556. 
It is important to remember that all of these studies consider the effect of all types 
of rape law reform together. Id. at 556 & nn.9-1O. Therefore, rape shield legislation, by 
itself, is even less effective in encouraging the reporting of sexual assaults. 
187. Id. 
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evidence that rape shield statutes have had no effect on encourag­
ing women to report sexual assaults. l88 It could be argued that 
more time must pass before it can be determined whether rape 
shield statutes have encouraged women to report sexual assaults. 
However, rape shield statutes have existed for twenty years.189 If 
rape shield statutes have not encouraged women to report their at­
tackers in the first twenty years of their existence, then it is reason­
able to assume that their impact on reporting sexual assaults will 
continue to be negligible in the future. 
In addition, allowing a limited exception for sexual history evi­
dence that would tend to show the victim's motive to fabricate will 
probably not affect any woman who would be encouraged by a rape 
shield statute to report a sexual assault. It is unlikely that many 
members of the public would even realize that a motive to fabricate 
exception to rape shield statutes exists.190 If victims do not know 
that a motive to fabricate exception exists, its existence can have no 
effect on the victim's decision of whether to report a sexual assault. 
Further, under Olden, the very fact that this issue is arguable 
means that Olden controls.191 Olden does not require courts to 
favor the defendant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabri­
cate only if the other legitimate interest serves no benefit.192 In­
stead, Olden allows a defendant to examine a witness's motive to 
fabricate if the conflicting interest has speculative benefits .193 For 
these reasons, the fact that legislatures enacted rape shield statutes 
to encourage women to report sexual assaults cannot justify re­
stricting the defendant's right to examine a witness's motive to 
fabricate. 
188. Id. 
189. Galvin, supra note 6, at 765 n.3. 
190. Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Targeted, Direct-Mail Solicitation: Shapero v. Kentucky 
Bar Association Under Attack, 25 Loy. U. Qu. L.J. 1 (1993) ("The vast majority of the 
public exhibits an alarming ignorance about the law and its impact on their lives."); 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Essay, People's Court, 44 VAND. L. REv. 847,860 (1991) (noting 
the public's general ignorance about the law). 
191. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam). The Supreme 
Court stated that interests with speculative benefits cannot justify restricting the defend­
ant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate. The word "speculative" means 
"not established by demonstration." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC­
TIONARY 2189 (3d ed. 1976). Therefore, if something is arguable, it cannot be estab­
lished by demonstration. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of Olden. 
192. Olden,488 U.S. at 231. 
193. Id. 
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3. 	 Helping to Eliminate Gender Bias Versus Defendant's 
Constitutional Rights 
Legislatures also enacted rape shield statutes hoping that they 
would help eliminate gender bias in the determination of whether a 
sexual assault occurred.194 Gender bias results from the fact that 
men have different "perceptions of the quality and nature of con­
sent" to sexual intercourse,195 This is especially true given the fact 
that women are socialized "to react passively to male sexual 
aggression. "196 
The precedential value of Olden in dismissing gender bias as a 
justification for restricting the defendant's right to examine a wit­
ness's motive to fabricate is particularly strong.197 In Olden, the 
United States Supreme Court held that "speculation as to the effect 
of jurors' racial biases cannot justify exclusion of cross-examina­
tion" of the witness's motive to fabricate,198 Here, we are con­
cerned with the speculative nature of the juror's gender biases.199 If 
gender bias is substantially similar to the type of racial bias that the 
Court considered in Olden, then gender bias cannot be a justifica­
tion for restricting the defendant's right to examine the victim's mo­
tive to fabricate. 
Gender and racial biases 'are nearly identical for purposes of 
the Olden analysis. First, both gender and racial bias have been 
prevalent for centuries.20o In addition, there is no way of knowing 
for sure whether jurors have either a gender or racial bias or what 
effect that bias will have on their decisions. Further, prosecutors 
194, Simmons, supra note 68, at 1604-05, For a general discussion of gender bias 
in courts, see Hon, Dorothy W, Nelson, Introduction to the Effects of Gender in the 
Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. 
CAL, L. REv. 731 (1994); Kittie D. Warshawsky, The Judicial Canons: A First Seep in 
Addressing Gender Bias in the Courtroom, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1047 (1994). 
195. Simmons, supra note 68, at 1604. 
196. [d. 
197. Olden, 488 U.S. at 231 (holding speculation as to the effect racially-related 
evidence had on juror's racial bias could not justify restricting the defendant's right to 
examine a witness's motive to fabricate). 
198. Id. at 232. . 
199. A bias is a "prepossession with some Object or point of view [such] that the 
mind does not respond impartially to anything related to this object or point of view." 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 211 (3d ed. 1976). 
200. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After 
Batson v, KentUCky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and First Amendment 
Analysis, 94 MICH. L. REv. 191,205-07 (1995) (discussing discrimination against minori­
ties and women in jury selection); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Appendix: Some Notes on 
State Affirmative Action in Employment, 26 PAC. L.J. 812, 812-13 (1995) (noting history 
of discrimination in employment against minorities and women). 
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have both the opportunity and motive to exclude people who have 
either gender or racial biases if such a bias will have an effect on a 
juror's decision. Thus, there are other protections against such bias, 
but bias of some sort is basically unpreventable. 
These material similarities between gender and racial biases 
show that Olden must apply equally to claims of possible racial and 
gender bias. The Olden Court recognized that the speculative ben­
efit of excluding evidence that may create a possible jury bias could 
not justify restricting the defendant's strong interest in examining a 
witness's motive to fabricate.201 Therefore, the rape shield statute's 
interest in helping to eliminate gender bias in the courtroom cannot 
justify restricting the defendant's right to examine the victim's mo­
tive to fabricate. 
4. Weighing All of the Interests 
Courts should not interpret rape shield statutes to exclude sex­
ual history evidence relevant to the victim's motive to fabricate. 
The Supreme Court held in Rock v. Arkansas that courts may not 
abridge the accused's constitutionally protected right to present evi­
dence in his or her own behalf if such a restriction would be arbi­
trary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to 
serve.202 The purpose of rape shield statutes is to protect the pri­
vacy rights of sexual assault victims,203 to encourage sexual assault 
victims to report their attackers,204 and to eliminate gender bias in 
the court room.205 Davis v. Alaska and Olden v. Kentucky exem­
plify that restricting a defendant's right to examine a witness's mo­
tive to fabricate to advance the interests protected by rape shield 
statutes would be arbitrary and disproportionate to the purposes 
they are designed to serve.206 
The privacy interests protected by rape shield statutes are sub­
stantially similar to the privacy interests protected by juvenile rec­
ord-protection statutes that the Supreme Court considered in Davis 
201. Olden, 488 U.S. at 231-32. 
202. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987). See supra notes 31-36 and 
accompanying text fora discussion of Rock. 
203. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991). See supra notes 92-99 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Lucas. 
204. Statement by President Carter on Signing H.R. 4727 into Law, Protection for 
the Privacy of Rape Victims, II PuB. PAPERS: Jimmy Carter 1902 (Oct. 30, 1978). 
205. Simmons, supra note 68, at 1604-05. 
206. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam); Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320-21 (1974). 
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v. Alaska.207 . In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the policy in­
terests protected by juvenile-record protection statutes must give 
way to the defendant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabri­
cate.20S Both juvenile record-protection statutes and rape shield 
statutes prevent the examination of information that the party in 
question would prefer to remain unknown.209 In addition, both the 
juvenile witness and the rape victim will be humiliated and embar­
rassed if this information is made public.210 Despite any nominal 
differences between rape shield statutes and juvenile record protec­
tion statutes, the privacy interests protected by both statutes are 
essentially the same.211 Therefore, Davis rejects the rape shield 
law's privacy interest rationale as a grounds for restricting the de­
fendant's right to examine the victim's motive to fabricate. 
In addition, the fact that legislatures enacted rape shield stat­
utes to encourage women to report sexual assaults is similar to the 
interest considered by the Supreme Court in Olden v. Kentucky.212 
In Olden, the Supreme Court held that the speculative benefit of 
excluding evidence that the white victim was living with a black 
man could not justify restricting the defendant's constitutionally 
protected right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate.213 Like­
wise, the benefit of rape shield statutes in encouraging women to 
report sexual assaults is speculative at best.214 Studies reveal that 
there has not been an increase in the number of reported sexual 
assaults since rape shield statutes took effect.2Is The United States 
Supreme Court has already held in Olden that interests with specu­
lative benefits cannot be used to restrict the defendant's right to 
examine a witness's motive to fabricate.216 Therefore, the fact that 
legislatures adopted rape shield statutes to encourage women to re­
2ff7. Davis, 415 U.S. 308. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Davis. 
208. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320. 
209. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991); Davis, 415 U.S. at 320­
21. 
210. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149-50; Davis, 415 U.S. at 320-21. 
211. See supra part II.A.l for a comparison of the privacy interests protected by 
rape shield statutes and juvenile record-protection statutes. 
212. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227,232 (1988) (per curiam). See supra 
notes 50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Olden. 
213. Olden, 488 U.S. at 231-33. 
214. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 186, at 556. 
215. Id. 
216. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Olden. 
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port sexual assaults cannot justify preventing the defendant from 
examining a sexual assault victim's motive to fabricate. 
Finally, rape shield statutes' interest in eliminating gender bias 
in the courtroom does not justify restricting the criminal defend~ 
ant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate. The Olden 
Court held that "speculation as to the effect of jurors' racial biases 
cannot justify" excluding evidence relating to the witness's motive 
to fabricate.217 The reasoning of Olden applies equally to gender 
bias. It is impossible to know exactly how evidence of a victim's 
sexual history-which is limited to that which is relevant and proba­
tive on the issue of the victim's motive to fabricate-will effect the 
jurors' gender biases. Therefore, the fact that legislatures enacted 
rape shield statutes to help eliminate gender bias cannot justify re­
stricting the defendant's right to examine a witness's motive to 
fabricate. 
Although neither Davis nor Olden specifically involved rape 
shield statutes, other cases such as United States v. Williams ,218 
Commonwealth v. Joyce,219 and Lewis v. State220 have recognized 
the holdings in Davis and Olden as encompassing the policy consid­
erations protected by rape shield statutes.221 Davis and Olden re­
ject all three types of interests protected by rape shield statutes as 
justifications for abrogating the defendant's right to examine a wit­
ness's motive to fabricate.222 Therefore, courts should not interpret 
rape shield statutes to automatically exclude sexual history evi­
dence relative to the victim's motive to fabricate. 
B. Finding a Middle Ground 
It may appear that recognizing a motive to fabricate exception 
to rape shield statutes would allow every criminal defendant to in­
troduce potentially damaging sexual history evidence about the vic­
217. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232. 
218. 37 M.J. 352 (C.M.A. 1993). See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Williams. 
219. 415 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1981). See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Joyce. 
220. 591 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1991). See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Lewis. 
221. See, e.g., United States v. Nez, 661 F.2d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 1981); Williams, 
37 M.J. at 360; Lewis, 591 So. 2d at 925; State v. Parker, 730 P.2d 921, 925 (Idaho 1986); 
Joyce, 415 N.E.2d at 186; Winfield v. Commonwealth, 301 S.E.2d 15,21 (Va. 1983). 
222. See supra part II.A.l-II.A.3 for a discussion of how Davis and Olden reject 
the interests protected by rape shield laws as justifications for restricting the defend­
ant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate. 
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tim by stating that the witness had a motive to fabricate. However, 
this should not be the result because courts have tools for preclud­
ing evidence that is of little or no probative value and that presents 
a serious risk of misuse. 
First, courts can exclude evidence on relevancy grounds. For 
example, Federal Rule of Evidence 402 declares that irrelevant evi­
dence is inadmissible.223 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines rele­
vant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence ... more probable or 
less probable than ... without the evidence."224 Therefore, courts 
always have the option of excluding sexual history evidence that 
does not actually bear on an issue of consequence to the case.225 
Admittedly, relevance is a fairly easy standard to meet.226 
However, courts can also exclude sexual history evidence under 
probative value-prejudicial impact balancing tests (probative value 
weighing tests).227 For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 al­
lows courts to exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of 
the evidence "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by con­
siderations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence."228 Therefore, when the sexual history evi­
dence does not have a strong tendency to show that the victim may 
have lied, courts may be able to properly exclude the sexual history 
evidence under probative value weighing tests. 
There are a number of circumstances in which courts may be 
able to properly exclude sexual history evidence under a probative 
value weighing test. For example, a court probably could exclude 
sexual history evidence if it has a low probative value and there is a 
danger that the evidence will establish that the victim is promiscu­
223. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
224. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
225. E.g., United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1991); White v. 
State, 598 A.2d 187, 193-94 (Md. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 975 (1992). 
226. Joan L. Larsen, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning: The Accused's 
Use of Exculpatory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule 404(b), 87 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 651,654 ("relevance ... is relatively easy to clear given the liberal standards 
established ..."); Elaine A. Imbriani, Casenote, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 259, 287 
(1993) (quoting Dawson V. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 174 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting), 
for the proposition that relevance is an easy standard for defendants to satisfy). 
227. FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 provides that "relevant[ ] evidence may be ex­
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju­
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id. 
228. Id. 
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ous. Although, society has generally accepted that women have sex 
outside of marriage,229 if a woman has had sex with several men, 
some fact~finders may believe that she is promiscuous. Many peo­
ple think that promiscuous women are unlikely to refuse a male's 
advances. Therefore, a strong danger arises that juries will be im­
properly influenced by motive to fabricate evidence which shows 
that the woman is promiscuous. 
In addition, courts may be able to exclude sexual history evi­
dence if it has a low probative value and the evidence adds nothing 
new to the issue in light of non-sexual evidence. One of the 
grounds under which courts can exclude relevant evidence is need­
less presentation of cumulative evldence.23o If the sexual history 
evidence adds absolutely nothing new to the issue in light of non~ 
sexual history evidence, then allowing the sexual history evidence is 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. There may be other 
situations in which the judge can use a probative value weighing 
test to exclude sexual history evidence. However, the issue is less 
clear when the evidence becomes more probative, less dangerous, 
and fewer alternative pieces of evidence that show the victim's mo­
tive to lie exist. 
United States v. Payne231 exemplifies how courts can employ a 
combined relevance and probative value weighing test to exclude 
sexual history evidence. In Payne, the defendant, who was the vic­
tim's step-father, claimed that the trial court erred in failing to ad­
mit evidence that he found the victim "in a state of partial undress 
engaged in heavy petting with a boy."232 The defendant claimed 
the evidence established a motive to fabricate because the victim 
wanted to retaliate for being punished.233 
In Payne, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit used a combined relevance and probative value weighing 
test to exclude sexual history evidence relating to the victim's mo­
tive to fabricate.234 The court reasoned that the evidence was "min­
imally (if at aU) probative" because the victim's first claim of 
molestation occurred more than seven months after the defendant 
disciplined her for the episode of heavy petting.235 In addition, the 
229. Wayman, supra note 63, at 871-72. 
230. See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
231. 944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 975 (1992). 
232. [d. at 1468. 
233. Id. at 1468-69. 
234. [d. at 1468-70. 
235. [d. at 1469. 
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court reasoned that since the trial court allowed the defendant to 
testify that he punished the victim for an incident, describing the 
sexual nature of the incident added nothing new to the victim's mo­
tive to lie.236 Given these findings, the court held that the trial 
court properly excluded the sexual conduct evidence. If courts em­
ploy this type of relevance and probative value weighing analysis, 
they can eliminate most of the fraudulent claims made under the 
motive to fabricate exception. 
Even with these built-in safeguards, some sexual assault de­
fendants will be able to satisfy the relevancy and probative value 
weighing tests and improperly introduce sexual history evidence by 
saying that it is related to the victim's motive to fabricate. This is 
unfortunate. However, Davis v. Alaska and Olden v. Kentucky 
show that the defendant's constitutional right to examine a wit­
ness's motive to fabricate cannot be restricted by the privacy inter­
ests237 and the interests of speculative value238 that rape shield 
statutes protect. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant has the right to present relevant testimony in 
his own behalf. This includes the right to examine the alleged vic­
tim for bias and a possible motive to fabricate. This right is cer­
tainly not unyielding and may be abridged by other legitimate 
interests. However, restricting the defendant's right to present rele­
vant testimony about the victim's motive to fabricate cannot be 
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes the restriction is 
designed to serve. 
Rape shield statutes serve the legitimate interest of protecting 
sexual assault victims from such things as public humiliation and 
unfair invasions of privacy. By protecting the privacy interests of 
the victim, the proponents of rape shield statut..!s also hoped to en­
courage sexual assault victims to report sexual assaults to the po­
lice. In addition, rape shield statutes are also designed to eliminate 
or reduce gender bias in the court room. By serving such legitimate 
interests, courts may interpret rape shield statutes to exclude evi­
dence of a victim's motive to fabricate if such an exclusion is neither 
236. Id. 
237. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974). See supra notes 39-49 and accom­
panying text for a discussion of Davis. 
238. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988) (per curiam). See supra notes 
50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Olden. 
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arbitrary nor disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to 
serve. 
However, the United States Supreme Court's rulings in Davis 
v. Alaska and Olden v. Kentucky hold that the interests protected 
by rape shield statutes cannot justify restricting the defendant's 
right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate. Therefore, courts 
must admit the sexual history evidence relating to the victim's mo­
tive to fabricate. Sexual history evidence must, however, first pass 
the relevancy and probative value balancing tests before courts 
must admit such evidence. In some cases, a defendant may in bad 
faith introduce sexual history evidence notwithstanding relevancy 
and probative value-prejudicial impact tests. Although permitting 
some defendants to make bad faith allegations undermines the ef­
fectiveness of rape shield statutes, this result is required by the 
Supreme Court's holdings in Davis v. Alaska and Olden v. 
Kentucky. 
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